Five applied problems in resilient timing, navigation, sensing, and
trust — closer to the lab's active engineering. Each is stated plainly, with the
constraint that keeps it open.
01
Assured time integrity
Whether a distributed set of clocks can hold verifiable time
through combined denial and deception — detecting a manipulated synchronization
signal, not only surviving a missing one. Most current work addresses holdover,
keeping time when a reference is jammed or denied; that handles denial but not
deception, since a clock that holds perfectly can still accept a manipulated
re-synchronization signal.
Constraint — with round-trip
timing alone, an asymmetric path delay and a clock offset are indistinguishable.
Detecting a subtle manipulation requires an independent reference that does not
travel through the same channel.
02
Navigation integrity
Whether a magnetic-anomaly navigation system can detect, in real
time, when its reference field is being corrupted by space weather or daily
variation.
Constraint — the stable field and
the transient corruption reach the same sensor, and cannot be separated at a
single node without an independent temporal reference.
03
Edge trust
Whether a disconnected device can continuously authenticate both
itself and its operator with no network callback, and degrade predictably rather
than catastrophically if it is physically captured.
Constraint — how much compromising
one factor reveals about the other, once the two are combined, is unresolved in
the underlying theory. The direction is held pending progress on that question.
04
Passive distributed sensing
Whether a low-cost mesh of passive sensors can detect and locate
an object from its magnetic signature and distinguish it from natural geophysical
noise at useful range.
Constraint — a magnetic signature
falls off steeply with distance, a hard limit no processing removes, which sets a
floor on how dense the mesh must be for a given range.
05
Data provenance
Whether a recorded observation's time and place of origin can
remain verifiable after the fact, even if the device that made it is later fully
compromised.
Constraint — a device holding all
of its own keys can forge its own clock. A timestamp that survives later
compromise requires an external reference the device could not have predicted or
manufactured in advance.